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Bell’s Everett (?) theory, or the pilot-wave theory without trajec-
tories, is Bell’s interpretation of Everett’s theory, aiming to remove the
picture of many worlds from the theory. In this paper, I argue that
Bell’s attempt is not successful, since his Everett (?) theory contradicts
quantum mechanics and experiments.
John Bell was one of the few leading figures in quantum foundations
who took Everett’s theory seriously as early as 1970s. Certainly, he was
an opponent, not a proponent. In 1971, Bell wrote a paper titled “On
the hypothesis that the Schrödinger equation is exact” (Bell, 1971). The
paper was latter published in Epistemological Letters (Bell, 1978), and a
revised version of the paper was published with a more well-known title
“Quantum mechanics for cosmologists” in the volume Quantum Gravity
2 (Bell, 1981). In these papers, Bell proposed his Everett (?) theory as
the “final synthesis, omitting de Broglie’s trajectories and Everett’s other
branches” (Bell, 1976).1 In this paper, I will present a new analysis of
Bell’s Everett (?) theory, and show that the theory contradicts quantum
mechanics and experiments.
Bell’s Everett (?) theory is simply the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie
and Bohm without the continuous particle trajectories (Bell, 1981). In the
pilot-wave theory (de Broglie, 1928; Bohm, 1952), a complete realistic de-
scription of a quantum system is provided by the configuration defined by
the positions of its particles together with its wave function. The law of mo-
tion is expressed by two equations: a guiding equation for the configuration
of particles and the Schrödinger equation, describing the time evolution of
1Bell also discussed his Everett (?) theory in his contribution in honor of Louis de
Broglie on the occasion of the jubilee of de Broglie’s celebrated thesis (Bell, 1976).
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the wave function which enters the guiding equation. The law of motion can








where X(t) denotes the spatial configuration of particles, Ψ(t) is the wave
function at time t, and v equals to the velocity of probability density in
standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, it is assumed that at some initial
instant t0, the epistemic probability of the configuration, ρ(X(t0), t0), is
given by the Born rule: ρ(X(t0), t0) = |Ψ(X(t0), t0)|2. This is the quantum
equilibrium hypothesis, which, together with the law of motion, ensures the
empirical equivalence between the pilot-wave theory and standard quantum
mechanics.
According to Bell (1981), the continuous particle trajectories are not an
essential part of the pilot-wave theory, and there is no need to link successive
configurations of the world into a continuous trajectory. Bell further thought
that keeping the instantaneous configurations, but discarding the trajectory,
is the essential of Everett’s theory. This is Bell’s Everett (?) theory or the
pilot-wave theory without trajectories. In Bell’s own words,
instantaneous classical configuration x are supposed to exist, and
to be distributed in the comparison class of possible worlds with
probability |ψ|2. But no pairing of configuration at different
times, as would be effected by the existence of trajectories, is
supposed. (Bell, 1987, p.133)
In Bell’s Everett (?) theory, the deterministic guiding equation of the
pilot-wave theory is replaced by a random dynamics:
P (X(t), t) = |Ψ(X(t), t)|2, (3)
which means that at every instant the particle configuration is random,
and its probability of being a given X(t) is equal to the Born probability
|Ψ(X(t), t)|2. In other words, the particles do not move in a continuous,
deterministic way, but move in a discontinuous and random way (see also
Gao, 2017). It can be seen that the above random dynamics makes the
quantum equilibrium hypothesis unnecessary, and it unifies this seemingly
ad hoc hypothesis with the guiding equation in some sense.
Bell’s Everett (?) theory, being a one-world theory, is one of his attempts
to refute the many worlds picture. Bell wrote, “it seems to me that this
multiplication of universes is extravagant, and serves no real purpose in the
theory, and can simply be dropped without repercussions.” (Bell, 1987,
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p.133) In the following, I will analyze the key issue of whether Bell’s Everett
(?) theory agrees with quantum mechanics and experiments. I will not
discuss the ontology of the theory, such as the meaning of the wave fucntion
and the properties of the particles in the theory (for a recent analysis see
Gao, 2017).
Consider a simple x-spin measurement, in which an observer M measures
the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that is in a superposition of two
different x-spins.2 According to the linear Schrödinger equation, the state
of the composite system after the measurement will be the superposition of
M recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up and M recording x-spin down
and S being x-spin down:
α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M , (4)
where α and β are not zero and satisfy the normalization condition |α|2 +
|β|2 = 1.
According to Bell’s Everett (?) theory, the positions of the particles
representing the measurement record of M are definite at each instant.
Moreover, these particles randomly jump between the two states |up〉M and
|down〉M over time, and the probability of they being in these two states at
each instant are |α|2 and |β|2, respectively. Then the observer M will at each
instant have a determinate record corresponding to one of the two terms in
the above superposition, that is, at each instant M ’s particle configuration
will effectively select one of the two terms in the superposition as actual
and thus M ’s mental state will be the state with the determinate record
x-spin up or the determinate record x-spin down. Moreover, which particle
configuration M ends up with, and thus which determinate record he gets,
is randomly determined at the instant, and the probability of M getting
a particular record is equal to the modulus squared of the wave function
associated with the record, namely the probability of M ending up with a
configuration recording x-spin up is |α|2 and the probability of M ending up
with a configuration recording x-spin down is |β|2. This is consistent with
the Born rule.
Obviously, due to the essential randomness of the motion of particles,
the observer M ’s measurement record will change in a random way over
time and thus be unreliable as a record of what actually happened. As Bell
(1981) argued, however, that there is no association of the particular present
with any particular past does not matter. “For we have no access to the
past. We have only our ‘memories’ and ‘records’. But these memories and
records are in fact present phenomena. The theory should account for the
present correlations between these present phenomena. And in this respect
we have seen it to agree with ordinary quantum mechanics, in so far as the
latter is unambiguous.” (Bell, 1987, 135-6)
2My analysis of this example basically follows Barrett (1999, 123-6).
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Here is a more detailed explanation of Bell’s idea as given by Barrett
(1999, 123-5). Suppose the observer M gets the result x-spin up for her
first measurement. When she repeats her measurement, the state of the
composite system after this second measurement will be
α |up〉S |up, up〉M + β |down〉S |down, down〉M (5)
by the linear Schrödinger evolution. Now, according to Bell’s Everett (?)
theory, there is a probability of |β|2 that M will end up with a configuration
recording x-spin down for the second result even though he recorded x-spin
up for the first result. Thus it appears that there is a probability of |β|2
that M ’s two measurement results will disagree. However, if M does get
x-spin down for her second measurement, her configuration will be the one
associated with the second term of the above state. This means that M ’s
actual memory configuration will record x-spin down for her first result, and
thus forM the two measurements in fact yield the same result. Therefore, for
repeated measurements, Bell’s Everett (?) theory still agrees with quantum
mechanics.
What the above analysis shows is the consistency of the results of re-
peated measurements on a single quantum system in Bell’s Everett (?) the-
ory. According to the theory, if M records x-spin up for her first result,
there is still a non-zero probability |β|2 that he will get x-spin down for her
second measurement. This prediction itself contradicts quantum mechanics,
according to which if M ’s first result is x-spin up, then her second result
must be also x-spin up. But according to Bell’s Everett (?) theory, when
we actually test this prediction, a strange thing happens; M ’s second mea-
surement, whose result is x-spin down, will change her memory of the first
result and make it be also x-spin down. In this case, M will think her first
result is also x-spin down, and thus her second result is the same as her first
result as quantum mechanics predicts.
So far so good. However, when considering an ensemble of identically
prepared systems, it can be shown that Bell’s Everett (?) theory does not
agrees with quantum mechanics and experiments. Consider an ensemble of
the above spin one-half systems being in a superposition of two different x-
spins, for which M ’s first measurement result is x-spin up. These results are
recorded. This is preparation of the x-spin up state in experiments. Then,
M makes her second measurements on these systems. Quantum mechanics
will predict and experiments will also show that M ’s second measurement
results will be all x-spin up, the same as her first recorded results. This
is verification of the prepared x-spin up state. These two procedures are
common in usual quantum experiments. However, Bell’s Everett (?) theory
will predict that M ’s second measurement results will be partly x-spin up
and partly x-spin down. Certainly, according to this theory, M will not
know her first measurement results are all x-spin up; rather, she will think
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her first measurement results are also partly x-spin up and partly x-spin
down, and for each system her second result is still the same as her first
result. Thus, Bell’s Everett (?) theory contradicts quantum mechanics and
experimental observations for this experiment, and for the preparation and
verification of quantum states in general.
Another way to see the above contradiction is to notice that in Bell’s
Everett (?) theory, we cannot prepare an ensemble of quantum systems for
which the results of the measurements of an observable on these systems are
all the same. In other words, we cannot prepare a quantum state which is
equivalent to an eigenstate of an observable in standard quantum mechan-
ics. Since Bell’s Everett (?) theory is a unitary quantum theory, the state
of a quantum system is in general a superposition of the eigenstates of an
observable. Then due to the random jumps of particles, the measurement
result for each system is always random, being one of the eigenvalues of the
observable, and the results will be a Born probability distribution over all
eigenvalues. This is not consistent with experiments. By comparison, in
other unitary quantum theories such as the pilot-wave theory or the many-
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, we can prepare an ensemble of
quantum systems for which the results of the measurements of an observable
on these systems are all the same. In other words, we can prepare a quan-
tum state which is equivalent to an eigenstate of an observable in standard
quantum mechanics. This is consistent with experiments.
Finally, it is worth noting that the unreliability of an observer’s memo-
ries in Bell’s Everett (?) theory will also lead to an empirical incoherence
problem (Barrett, 1999, p.126). The problem is that although one can test
the instantaneous empirical predictions of the theory (i.e. the way that mea-
surement records are correlated at a particular instant), one cannot test its
dynamical law that governs the time evolution of the particle configuration
because one’s memories of measurement records are unreliable. In other
words, even if the dynamical law of the theory were correct, one could not
have an empirical justification for accepting that it is correct.
To sum up, I have argued that Bell’s Everett (?) theory is not true, since
it contradicts quantum mechanics and experiments for the preparation and
verification of quantum states. However, Bell’s two insightful observations
may turn out to be correct: one is that the continuous particle trajectories
are not an essential part of the pilot-wave theory, and the other is that
keeping the instantaneous configurations but discarding the trajectory is
the essential of Everett’s theory. Maybe the final synthesis is a picture of
many emergent worlds with particles in jump motion (Wallace, 2012; Gao,
2017). I will investigate this intriguing issue in future work.
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